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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TED CHARLES HANSEN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960516-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered July 15, 1996.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did Instruction 22 stating that "any act in

furtherance of arranging to distribute a controlled substance is
a criminal offense" allow the jury to convict Hansen without
finding that he had the requisite statutory intent?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's jury instructions

on the elements of a crime are reviewed under a correctness
standard.

State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App.

1995) .
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel objected to the

admission of Instruction 22 on the grounds that it reduced the
burden of proof the State had to meet because it did not
accurately state the actus reus or mens rea of the offense.
R. 623.

ISSUE II:

Did Instruction 21 incorrectly define the

actus reus of arranging to distribute a controlled substance?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The appropriate standard of review

for a trial court's interpretation of statutory law and the
propriety of jury instructions is correction of error.

State v.

James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d
362, 363-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel objected to the

admission of Instruction 21 on the grounds that the definition of
"arranging" was incorrect, over broad, and in conflict with State
v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
ISSUE III:

R. 622-23.

Was there sufficient evidence to sustain

Hansen's conviction of arranging to distribute cocaine?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court will reverse a criminal

case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

After the close of the State's

case, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
State had failed to make a prima facie showing that Hansen had
arranged to distribute cocaine.
ISSUE IV:

R. 569-75.

Did the trial court err by admitting evidence

of Hansen's statements to undercover FBI agents that he knew
people who could sell them other controlled substances under
2

Rules 404(b) and 403 to prove intent?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's decision to admit

evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed with "very limited
deference, according it a relatively small degree of discretion."
State v. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah 1997).

Though

the issue is not reviewed de novo, the trial court's
justification for admitting evidence under 404(b) will be closely
reviewed.

Id.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

Defense counsel filed a motion in

limine to exclude evidence of Hansen's statements to undercover
agents regarding his ability to procure controlled substances.
R. 28-30.

A hearing was held on May 1, 1996 where defense

counsel argued that the evidence was not admissible under Rules
404(b) and 4 03.

R. 218-219.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes and rules is contained in Addendum A:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1994)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hansen was convicted after a two-day jury trial of
3

Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting, or
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)
(1994), in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County.

On July 15, 1996, Judge David S. Young sentenced Hansen

to serve a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
FACTS
On August 2, 1994, Ted Hansen ("Hansen") accompanied
Thomas Walker ("Walker") and Tim Ingram ("Ingram"), a paid
government informant, to 1063 East 33 00 South in Salt Lake
County.

Unknown to Hansen and Walker, FBI agents had hidden a

video camera at the site to record conversations between
themselves, Hansen, Ingram, and Walker.1
Ingram did not testify.

R. 477-79, 487.

Though the FBI had paid Ingram $1,000

for his cooperation, they did not know his whereabouts at the
time of trial.

R. 516. When Hansen and Walker arrived, Agent

Vince Garcia ("Garcia") asked them if they were wearing wires or
had weapons outside the door and demonstrated to them that he was
not wearing a wire by pulling up his shirt.

R. 558.

Once inside, Agent Richard Rasmussen ("Rasmussen")
offered Hansen a beer, telling him he was a concrete contractor

1

. The entire incident was video taped. A partially redacted
copy of the video was submitted into evidence by the State. There
is no written transcript of the video. However, in the left hand
corner of the video a clock is running.
Appellant will refer to
the video tape as "VT" when citing to facts that are contained in
the video.
The numbers appearing after citations to the video
refer to the time on the video where the reference can be found.
4

who needed employees for a project at the airport.
90, 493; VT. 10:22-24.

R. 477, 489-

Hansen and Walker were both unemployed

and had experience in concrete work.

R. 535-37.

Both expressed

an interest in obtaining employment from the agents' phony
concrete company.

Hansen gave Rasmussen his correct name,

telephone number, social security number, and job references in
hopes of obtaining employment.

R. 508-510, 563-64; VT. 10:28.

Rasmussen then told Garcia to get job applications for Hansen and
Walker.

Rasmussen told Hansen and Walker he would put them in

touch with his foreman.

VT. 10:29.

Walker left the room

briefly, during which time Hansen continued to talk about his
work experience.

VT. 10:31.

After giving employment information to the agents, Walker
and Ingram began discussing with the agents the sale of cocaine.
VT. 10:32-34.

Walker and Ingram agreed to obtain $480 worth of

cocaine for the agents.
negotiations.

Hansen was not involved in the

He never handled the cocaine or made assurances

about its quality.

VT. 10:32-34, 11:16-33; R. 564-65.

was not given any of the money.

Hansen

VT. 10:32-36; R. 565-66.

After Walker had negotiated the price, Rasmussen asked
who had driven.

VT. 10:34.

When Hansen indicated he had driven,

Rasmussen told Hansen to stay behind.

Hansen gave his keys to

Walker and remained with Rasmussen and Garcia.

VT. 10:34.

Contrary to Rasmussen's testimony, there was no indication that
Hansen was originally supposed to bring back the cocaine.
R. 524; VT. 10:34.

Ingram took the money.
5

VT. 10:34.

Walker

told the agents that they should "take care of" Ingram by each
giving him a half gram of the cocaine.

VT. 10:35.

After Walker

and Ingram left, Rasmussen offered Hansen another beer.
VT. 10:36-37.
While Hansen was waiting for Walker and Ingram to return,
the agents asked Hansen if he sold drugs.

VT. 10:39.

Hansen

said that he knew people that sold drugs, mainly LSD and
marijuana, and that he had sold marijuana in the past.
VT. 10:39.

While they were waiting for Walker, Rasmussen asked

Hansen if he could trust Walker.
he could.

VT. 10:40.

with Walker.

VT. 10:40.

Hansen assured him

Garcia asked Hansen if he did business

VT. 10:40.

Hansen said no, but indicated that

Walker did not have a car.

Hansen said he did not ask for

anything in exchange for giving Walker rides.

VT. 10:40.

When asked how he made a living, Hansen replied that he
was a carpenter.
get them drugs.

VT. 10:40.
VT. 10:41.

The agents asked Hansen if he could
Hansen said he might be able to get

LSD, but would have to contact a third party first.
43.

Hansen again brought up his work experience.

VT. 10:41-

VT. 10:49.

Hansen also told the agents he could get them marijuana.
VT. 11:09-10.

Rasmussen gave Hansen another beer, and asked

Hansen how much he made "doing this" and asked if "this" wasn't
helping him pay the bills.

Hansen said no.

VT. 11:01-04.

Hansen again stated that he was just looking for a job.
VT. 11:04.
Rasmussen began to complain about the time.
6

VT. 11:07.

Hansen said he knew where Walker was going and that Walker had to
page someone to meet him.

Hansen said he wasn't sure whether

Walker had set up a deal before hand, but that he knew the people
Walker dealt with did not like anyone coming to their house.
VT. 11:07-08.

When Walker returned, he indicated that he had

"another customer" and chat there was someone else he had to go
with.

VT. 11:16.

cocaine.

Walker commented on the high quality of the

VT. 11:17.

When the cocaine turned out to be a quarter

gram light, Walker called to complain.

VT. 11:17.

Walker again

indicated that Ingram should be compensated, but did not mention
compensating Hansen.

In fact, the agents and Walker joked that

Hansen was the only one not getting compensated.

VT. 11:27-28.

Walker testified that Hansen did not plan or participate
in the cocaine deal.

R. 538.

Walker told the jury that he and

Ingram initiated the deal for their own profit.

R. 536.

Walker's intent in contacting Hansen that morning was to bring
him to the site to find work as Ingram had told Walker that his
"boss" might be hiring.

R. 535-37.

Walker did not tell Hansen

about the arrangement he had made with Ingram to sell the agents
cocaine prior to arriving.

R. 53 7.

Hansen never produced any controlled substances for the
agents.

He never took any money from the agents, nor did he take

the agents to anyone who did sell drugs.

R. 519, 566.

When

Garcia called Hansen that night, Hansen did not want to talk to
him, told him he could not get him any LSD, and hung up.
63.
7

R. 562-

Hansen filed a motion to suppress or redact those
portions of the videotape that were unrelated to this specific
cocaine transaction.

R. 28-30.

The trial court allowed Hansen's

statements that he knew people who sold LSD and marijuana and
might be able to get drugs for the agents under Rule 4 04(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence to prove intent.

R. 223-25.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when it
instructed the jury that "any act in furtherance of arranging to
distribute a controlled substance is a criminal offense pursuant
to statute."

Instruction 22 incorrectly stated the actus reus of

the offense and allowed the jury to convict without finding that
Hansen had the requisite intent in violation of due process of
law.

The error was not cured by the admission of a correct

Elements Instruction because the Elements Instruction
irreconcilably conflicted with Instruction 22.

Because there is

no way of knowing whether the jury relied upon the Elements
Instruction or Instruction 22 to convict, reversal is required.
The jury was not given an accurate description of the
elements of the offense of arranging to distribute a controlled
substance.

Instruction 21's definition of "arranging" is an

incorrect statement of the law.

The definition of "arranging"

provided to the jury is in conflict with case law.

Hansen was

prejudiced because the erroneous definition broadened the scope
of the actus reus of the arranging statute beyond its intended
reach.
8

There was insufficient evidence to establish that Hansen
arranged the distribution of cocaine.

The fact that Hansen drove

Walker to the undercover agent's office and loaned Walker his car
at the request of the agents did not establish that he arranged
the deal.

Hansen did not negotiate the price, handle the drugs,

or receive compensation.

There was not sufficient evidence to

establish that Hansen had the requisite intent.

The agents posed

as concrete contractors who were looking for workers, and it was
clear that Hansen accompanied Walker in the hopes of finding
employment.
The trial court committed reversible error by admitting
evidence under Rule 404(b) of discussions Hansen had with the
agents while Walker was gone about his ability to procure other
drugs not charged as part of the Information.
not necessary to the State's case.

The evidence was

It was not highly probative

of Hansen's intent to arrange the deal between Walker and the
agents.

It was unclear whether Hansen had the ability or the

intent to actually procure other drugs for the agents, and in
fact Hansen never followed through with his claim.

Lastly, the

prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its
probative value.

The error was not harmless because it cannot be

said with any assurance that the jury was not influenced by the
evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY SUBMITTING A JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH
ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT WITHOUT FINDING THAT
HANSEN HAD THE REQUISITE INTENT.
9

The trial court committed reversible error when it
instructed the jury that Hansen was guilty of a "criminal offense
by statute" if he engaged in any act which furthered the
distribution of drugs regardless of his intent.

Instruction 22

is constitutionally infirm because it allowed the jury to convict
without finding all of the elements of the offense.

In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368
(1970) .

Hansen was prejudiced because Instruction 22 left out

the element of intent, and lack of intent was Hansen's only
defense.

Even though the jury was given a correct Elements

Instruction, the error was not cured because there is no way of
knowing whether the jury relied upon the Elements Instruction or
Instruction 22 to convict.
A. Instruction 22 Is Constitutionally Infirm
Because It Stated That Hansen Could Be Found
Guilty Of Arranging To Distribute Drugs
Regardless Of His Intent.
The State submitted, over defense counsel's objection,
the following Instruction:
Under the law in the State of Utah any act in
furtherance of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance is a criminal offense
pursuant to statute.
The text of Instruction 22 was lifted out of context from State
v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah 1979), and has been
quoted in subsequent cases dealing with claims of insufficient
evidence to establish the crime of arranging to distribute a
controlled substance.

See, e.g., State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313,

1321 (Utah 1986).
10

An elements instruction using the language of the
applicable statute is in most cases sufficient to explain to the
jury the nature of an offense.
155 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

People v. Wadley, 890 P.2d 151,

The use of an excerpt from a court

opinion to embellish the statutory definition of an offense is
generally disfavored.

Ld.

Using an excerpt from an opinion as a

jury instruction is an unwise practice because an appellate
opinion and jury instructions have very different purposes.
Language from an opinion may be a correct expression of the law
in that context, but may not translate with clarity into jury
instructions.

Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 800 (Colo. 1985);

People v. Colantuono, 865 P.2d 704, 714 (Cal. 1994).
This case presents a perfect example of the pitfalls of
lifting a few phrases from an appellate opinion and turning them
into a jury instruction.

The State drafted Instruction 22 by

directly quoting a phrase from Harrison.

Harrison dealt with the

issue of whether the arranging to distribute a controlled
substance statute was unconstitutionally vague.2
923-24.

601 P. 2d at

Harrison held that even though the statute did not

specify what kinds of acts constitute arranging to distribute
drugs, because the actor must intend the distribution or sale of
a controlled substance, there can be no confusion as to whether

2

.
Prior to 1987, arranging to distribute a controlled
substance was a separate offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1) (a) (iv) (1986).
The same language of that statute has been
combined with the distribution statute under Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(1) (a) (ii) . This stylistic change does not alter the substance
of the holding in Harrison.
11

his conduct is criminal or not.

Ld.

The Harrison court compared

the arranging statute to conspiracy statutes which are not
unconstitutionally vague even though they do not define the actus
reus because the actor must intend to commit a crime.
924.

Id., at

The court went on to state:
Likewise, in the present situation, the citizen
is put on notice by the statute that, if he
intends the distribution for sale of a controlled
substance, any act in furtherance of an
arrangement therefor constitutes the criminal
offense described by the statute.

Id. (emphasis added).
Ironically, the State's instruction left out the most
important language of the Harrison opinion, the language which
focused on intent.

As written, Instruction 22 states that any

act in furtherance of distribution of a controlled substance is a
criminal offense.

Stated that way, the definition of arranging

suffers from the very constitutional infirmity the Harrison court
sought to avoid by focusing on the importance of proving that the
actor intended to illegally distribute drugs.
Under Instruction 22, if a parent loaned his car to his
teenage son, and the son subsequently used the car to deliver
drugs to a buyer without his parent's knowledge, the parent would
have committed "a criminal offense pursuant to statute."

In this

case, if the jury followed Instruction 22, the undercover FBI
agents and the paid informant would also be guilty of
distributing a controlled substance.
correct statement of the law.

This is clearly not a

Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923-24; Utah

Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1994).
12

"An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the
offense charged is essential."

State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 34

(Utah 1980); State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991);
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Due

process requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt
each essential element of the offense.

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364,

90 S.Ct. at 1073.

Failure to include the intent element is

reversible error.

Laine, 618 P.2d at 34.

Instruction 22 is

constitutionally infirm because it told the jury that they could
find that Hansen had committed the crime of arranging to
distribute drugs without determining the necessary intent
element.

Id.
B. The Inclusion Of A Correct Elements
Instruction Does Not Cure The Error In Submitting
Instruction 22.
Instruction 22, though incorrect, cannot be viewed in

isolation from the other instructions.

In this case, the jury

was provided with a correct Elements Instruction.
Instruction does not, however, cure the error.

The Elements

If the jury

instructions, considered in their entirety, correctly state the
law, an incorrect phrase or paragraph standing alone will not
constitute reversible error.

But if two instructions are in

direct conflict, and one is clearly prejudicial, the conviction
must be reversed because the jury may have followed the incorrect
instruction.

Cooper v. North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 483 (4th

Cir. 1983) .
For example, in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325,
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105 S.Ct. 1965, 1977 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), the Court held that
an instruction which created an unconstitutional presumption that
the defendant had the requisite intent was not cured by a general
instruction which stated that intent cannot be presumed.
Language that merely contradicts and does not
explain a constitutionally infirm instruction
will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of
the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors
applied in reaching their verdict.
Id. at 321, 1975.

This principle has been consistently applied

by Utah courts as well.

See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d

321, 326 (Utah 1985); State v. Hendricks, 258 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah
1953) .
C. Because Instruction 22 And The Elements
Instruction Irreconcilably Conflict, There Is No
Way Of Knowing Which One The Jury Relied Upon To
Convict.
In this case, Instruction 22 and the Elements Instruction
are in direct conflict.

Instruction 22 does not merely define

the element of arranging for the jury, it goes further and
instructs the jury that it is a crime to commit any act which
furthers the distribution of drugs.

Given the fact that they are

instructed to "consider all the jury instructions as a whole, and
to regard each in the light of all the others," reasonable jurors
would conclude that the "criminal offense pursuant to statute"
described in Instruction 22 refers to the charged crime.
Instruction 22 is cast in the language of command.
clearly sets forth the basis for a criminal conviction
independent of the Elements Instruction.
14

The Elements

R. 107.
It

Instruction told the jury they must find that Hansen intended to
arrange to distribute drugs to convict.

Instruction 22 told them

that intent was not a requirement to convict; that Hansen's
actions alone constituted a crime.

There is no qualifying

language or explanatory instruction indicating which instruction
the jury should consider.

Ultimately, the jury was left to

choose which instruction to follow.

As a matter of logical

necessity, they had to disregard one in order to comply with the
other.

If they obeyed the Elements Instruction which required

intent, they had to ignore Instruction 22.

If they chose to

follow Instruction 22 which did not require intent, they had to
ignore the Elements Instruction.
This case presents the reverse side of the issue
confronted by the court in Laine.

In Laine, the Elements

Instruction failed to include the requisite intent element, but
an "Information" instruction which gave the statutory definition
of the offense included the necessary intent element.

JEd. at 35.

Laine held that the failure to include the intent element in the
Elements Instruction was reversible error.

Xd.

The court

rejected the State's argument that the error in the Elements
Instruction was cured by an "Information" instruction that
included the necessary intent element.

Id.

Here, the Elements Instruction was correct and included
the intent element, but the "Information" instruction left out
the necessary mens rea.

The Laine court focused on the fact that

the Information Instruction did not say that the State had to
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prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.

Because the court found this difference sufficient to

reverse the conviction, the court did not need to address the
problem of giving the jury two contradictory instructions.

This

is precisely the issue presented in United States v. Perez, 43
F.3d 1131, (7th Cir. 1994).
In Perez, the jury was given two instructions on the
elements of assault with intent to commit murder.

The Elements

Instruction correctly stated that the government had to prove
intent to kill.

An Information Instruction, however, stated that

the government did not need to prove specific intent to kill.
Id. at 1134-35.

The Perez court concluded that the Information

Instruction permitted the jury to convict without determining
that the defendant had the requisite intent.

Id. at 1138.

Because the Information Instruction was directly contradictory to
the Elements Instruction, it had the effect of eliminating the
intent element necessary for a conviction.

The overall result

was a failure to instruct the jury on all of the elements of the
offense.

.Id. at 113 9.

The court concluded that because the

error affected the integrity of the proceeding itself, reversal
was required.

.Id. at 1140.

D. The Failure To Properly Instruct The Jury On
The Element Of Intent Cannot Be Harmless Error.
When an instruction leaves the jury with an erroneous
impression of the law regarding a principal issue in the trial,
reversal is required.
1981) .

State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 80 (Utah

The failure to provide an accurate instruction on the
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elements of an offense is "reversible error that can never be
considered harmless."

State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah

1991) (quoting State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985)).
Instruction 22 deprived Hansen of his only defense.

If

the jury followed Instruction 22 and ignored the Elements
Instruction then Hansen's intent was irrelevant and the State's
instruction was tantamount to a directed verdict.

See, e.g.,

State v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1982).
Instruction 22 left the jury with the unmistakable impression
that a lack of criminal intent could have no effect on the
criminality of his conduct.

There was little dispute as to

Hansen's actions as the entire incident was captured on video
tape.

Intent was the critical issue in Hansen's trial.

The

crucial question the jury was required to answer was whether
Hansen intended to arrange to distribute cocaine, or whether
despite his knowledge of the drug deal, his intent was not to
arrange drug deals, but to try to find a job.

If the jury was

properly instructed, they could have found that Hansen gave
Walker a ride because he wanted to apply for work.

They could

have concluded that Hansen stayed behind and gave his keys to
Walker simply because the man he was hoping would hire him to do
concrete work told him to stay behind.
Because the Elements Instruction irreconcilably
conflicted with Instruction 22, there is no way of knowing if all
or part of the jury relied on Instruction 22 to convict Hansen
and reversal is required.

Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; Hendricks,
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258 P.2d at 453.3
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO THE JURY AN INSTRUCTION
WHICH INCORRECTLY DEFINED ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
At the State's request, the trial court submitted
Instruction 21 which states in part:
"Arranging" means any witting or intentional
lending of aid in any form of any act in
furtherance of aiding in the distribution of
controlled substances.
Like Instruction 22, the State's definition of "arranging" was
also taken out of context from Harrison.

601 P.2d at 923.

"Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning should not
be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court.

It is

presumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand
the meaning of ordinary words."
(Utah 1977).

State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705

If the court is compelled to supply a definition of

an ordinary word, the dictionary is a far better choice than a
phrase taken out of context from an appellate decision.

Souza,

846 P.2d at 1320; Evans, 706 P.2d at 800; Colantuono, 865 P.2d at
714.
Cases like Harrison and its progeny are intended to deal
with a specific issue and fact situation.

Harrison held that the

arranging to distribute a controlled substance statute was not
unconstitutionally vague.

601 P.2d at 923-24.

3

In arriving at

. Instruction 22 also incorrectly defines the actus reus of
arranging to distribute a controlled substance for the reasons set
forth in Point II of this brief. As indicated in Point II, this
error was prejudicial and requires reversal.
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the conclusion that the statute gave adequate notice, the court
stated:
The statute in question accomplishes this byspecifying that any activity leading to or
resulting in the distribution for value of a
controlled substance must be engaged in knowingly
or with intent that such distribution would, or
would be likely to, occur. Thus, any witting or
intentional lending of aid in the distribution of
drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed by
the act.
Id. at 924.
The cases quoting this language from Harrison all deal
with sufficiency of the evidence claims.

Those cases stand only

for the proposition that the facts in each case were sufficient
as a matter of law to sustain the conviction.

The Harrison

opinion has given appellate courts a helpful guideline in making
that determination, but was never intended to provide a working
definition of the word "arrange" for purposes of a jury
instruction.

Given the context in which this phrase was written,

it is a correct statement of the law.

However, taken out of that

factual and procedural context, the quoted phrase does not
translate into an accurate jury instruction.

Just because an

appellate court found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
in a given case does not mean that it is appropriate or desirable
to borrow the broad language used by the court to reach that
decision to replace the common sense meaning of the word
"arrange."4
4

. Webster7s New World Dictionary, 2nd. Ed. defines "arrange"
as "to make ready; prepare or plan; to arrive at an agreement
about; settle to come to an agreement with a person about a thing."
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A. The Definition Of "Arranging" In
Instruction 21 Is Incorrect Because It Describes
An Actus Reus That Is Broader Than Intended By
Statute.
By taking the language from Harrison out of context and
using it as a definition, the State has created a very broad
quasi party liability to the offense of distributing a controlled
substance.

The State's definition of "arranging" in essence

describes a form of aiding and abetting.

The State's definition

makes anyone who "lends aid in any form" to one who distributes a
controlled substance guilty of distribution.

The State's

definition of "arranging" is broader than the intended statutory
meaning and is in conflict with State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117
(Utah 1987).
In Scott, the court held that § 58-37-19 and § 76-1103(1) prevented the State from charging a defendant with aiding
and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance.5
Id. at 120.

The court reasoned that if culpable conduct is

specifically defined by the Controlled Substances Act, and if the
definition of an offense in the Act was in conflict with the
definition of an offense in the criminal code, the Controlled
Substances Act took precedence.

JEd. at 120.

Scott argued that

the aiding and abetting statute was in conflict with the
arranging to distribute statute, and he should have been charged

Section 58-37-19 was repealed in 1992.
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with arranging rather than as a party to distribution.6

The

court agreed.
Although the penalty for aiding and abetting
would be the same as the penalty for arranging to
distribute, the offenses defined under the aiding
and abetting statute are different from those
defined under the arranging section.
Id. at 120.

The court held that the actus reus for aiding and

abetting in the distribution of drugs was different and broader
than for arranging to distribute drugs.

Id.

Because the actus

reus of "arranging" to distribute drugs was more specific than,
and in conflict with, aiding in the distribution of drugs, the
Controlled Substances Act took precedence and it was reversible
error to instruct the jury on party liability.

Id.

The State's definition of "arranging" is in direct
conflict with Scott because it essentially creates a broad form
of aiding and abetting.

If "arranging" to distribute were by

definition the equivalent of "lending aid" in the distribution of
drugs, then the result in Scott would have been different.

The

court would have found that no conflict existed between the two
statutes and Scott's conviction would have been affirmed.

The

State's definition of "arranging" cannot be squared with Scott..7
6

. As noted above, prior to 1987 arranging to distribute a
controlled substance was a separate offense under Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8 (1) (a) (iv) (1986). The same language of that statute has
been combined with the distribution statute under Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii).
7

. In State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah Ct. App.) the
court in dicta stated that Harrison provided a legitimate
definition of "arrange."
This opinion was not central to the
holding in Pelton which was that Harrison did not render the
arranging statute unconstitutionally vague.
To the extent that
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B. Hansen Was Prejudiced By Instruction 21
Because It Was Misleading And Incorrectly Stated
The Scope Of Conduct Punishable Under The
Statute.
It is crucial that the jury receive accurate instructions
on the elements of an offense.

Laine, 618 P.2d at 34; Jones, 823

P.2d at 1061; Souza, 846 P.2d at 1320.

Instruction 21 is

confusing, misleading, and incorrectly stated the law.
Instruction 21 stated that any "lending of aid in any form of any
act in furtherance of aiding" established the actus reus of
arranging to distribute drugs.

This language is confusing nearly

to the point of being nonsensical.

The instructions never define

"aid" so the State's definition of "arranging" is potentially
even broader than the aiding and abetting statute.

The State's

instruction was misleading because it precluded the jury from
applying the more specific, ordinary, common sense definition of
the term "arranging" to the facts of the case.
The jury was asked to decide whether Hansen "arranged" to
distribute drugs by driving Walker to the office and, at the
undercover FBI agent's request, remaining while Walker took his
car to buy the cocaine.

The prosecutor argued to the jury that

under Instruction 21, that conduct was sufficient to convict
because "doing anything in furtherance of the distribution of
cocaine" constitutes "arranging" under the statute.

R. 589-590.

The ordinary meaning of "arranging" requires a much more active
role.

Had the jury been allowed to apply the plain meaning of

Pelton adopts the Harrison opinion as a definition of "arranging,"
it is in conflict with Scott.
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the statutory terms to the case, they would have concluded that
Hansen's passive role did not rise to the level of arranging to
distribute cocaine.
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT HANSEN'S CONVICTION OF ARRANGING TO
DISTRIBUTE COCAINE.
The evidence in this case was insufficient to support a
conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1994) .8
There was no evidence that Hansen distributed, agreed, consented,
or offered to sell the cocaine.

Hansen did not participate in

the negotiations for the drug sale, did not accompany Walker to
make the purchase, did not handle the drugs or the money, and did
not profit from the transaction.
66.

VT. 10:32-36, 11:16-33; R. 564-

Hansen was not charged as a party.

In order to convict, the

8

.
In order to establish a challenge of insufficient
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting
the verdict, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
and demonstrate it is legally insufficient.
State v. Gray, 851
P. 2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The evidence supporting the
conviction was as follows:
1. Hansen gave Walker a ride to the agents' office.
2. After Hansen arrived, it was apparent that Walker was
in the process of selling cocaine to the agents.
3 . Hansen loaned his car to Walker knowing that Walker was
going to obtain cocaine for the agents.
4. At Rasmussen's request, Hansen stayed behind.
5. Hansen said he knew where Walker was going, and that he
may have to make a phone call to obtain the cocaine.
6. Hansen told the agents he could obtain other drugs for
them.
A full account of the facts can be found in the Facts section of
this Brief.
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jury had to find that Hansen "arranged" to distribute cocaine.9
Hansen's involvement was limited to providing Walker with
a ride, and allowing Walker to use his car to make the purchase.
Though Hansen did stay behind as "collateral" while Walker
purchased the cocaine, he stayed at Agent Rasmussen's request.
VT. 10:34.

Hansen's statement that he knew where Walker was

going establishes that he knew something about Walker's illegal
activities.

VT. 11:07-08.

However, Hansen's knowledge of

Walker's criminal conduct does not establish that Hansen arranged
the transaction between the agents, Walker, and Ingram.

Hansen's

knowledge that a crime was taking place coupled with his presence
would not even suffice to establish accomplice liability, let
alone the more narrow offense of arranging to distribute drugs.
An accomplice is a person who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent with the
principal offender, unites in the commission of
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be
real, not merely apparent. Mere presence
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to
be committed or a mental approbation while the
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act,
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice.
State v. Ferticr, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951) . As explained in
Point II of this Brief, the term "arranging" is not synonymous
with aiding and abetting.
Additionally, it is clear from the video tape that Hansen
accompanied Walker to try to find work.

R. 535-38.

He gave the

agents his correct name, social security number, address, phone
9

.
As a result of this incident, Walker plead guilty to
attempted distribution of cocaine. R. 533-34.
Ingram took the
FBI's money and disappeared. R. 516.
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number, and job references.

R. 508-10, 563-64; VT. 10:28, 10:31.

The most that could be inferred from the evidence was that Hansen
knew that Walker was selling cocaine to the agents, and he knew
that Walker was using his car to purchase the drugs.

This was

not sufficient evidence to establish that Hansen arranged for the
distribution of the cocaine.
A review of prior cases shows that there must be evidence
that the defendant played an instrumental part in arranging the
distribution of a controlled substance to sustain a conviction.
For example, in Pelton, the defendant told an undercover agent
that he would take him to a location where another man would sell
him cocaine.

801 P.2d at 185.

The defendant took the agent to

the location and the deal was later consummated when the
defendant was not present.

Id.

The court held that there was

sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of arranging to
distribute a controlled substance because he "knew that he would
be the triggering mechanism" which eventually led to the sale of
cocaine.

Id.

The "Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally,

and he was instrumental in arranging the sale of the cocaine."
Id. at 186.
The Pelton court's reasoning reflects the holdings of
other cases involving arranging to distribute a controlled
substance.

In all those cases, the defendant's actions were

instrumental in setting up the sale of the drugs.

In all those

cases, the defendant played a vital role by preparing, planning,
or making possible the eventual transaction.
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See, e.g., State v.

Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 103-104 (Utah 1983) (evidence sufficient
where defendant took informant to seller's house, collected the
money, and purchased the drugs for the informant); State v.
Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 68-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (evidence
sufficient where defendant told the informant the cocaine was of
good quality and that he and the other dealer were partners, made
attempts to contact the seller, and warned the informant when
they were followed); State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Utah
1986) (evidence sufficient where defendant drove the seller to
another house where the drugs were purchased, divided the drugs
between herself and the informant, and told the informant the
drugs were of good quality).
Walker's use of Hansen's car to buy the cocaine for the
undercover agents does not establish that Hansen was
"instrumental" in arranging the cocaine deal between Walker and
the agents.

Walker negotiated the deal to sell the cocaine

without the assistance of Hansen or his car.

There was no

evidence that Hansen introduced the undercover agents to Walker
for the purpose of arranging a drug buy.

In fact, Walker

testified that the only reason Hansen accompanied him to the site
was to try to get work.

R. 535-37.

Lastly, Hansen never

encouraged the sale by discussing the quality of the drugs or the
price.

Because the evidence was insufficient to establish that

Hansen arranged to distribute cocaine, his conviction should be
reversed.
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POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF HANSEN'S
DISCUSSIONS WITH UNDERCOVER AGENTS ABOUT HIS
ABILITY TO PROCURE OTHER DRUGS NOT RELATED TO THE
CHARGED CRIME UNDER RULES 403 AND 404(B), UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Evidence of the discussions Hansen had with undercover
agents regarding his ability to procure drugs other than those
charged as part of the Information was not admissible under Rules
403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

The trial court

justified the admission of this highly prejudicial evidence on
three grounds.

First, the trial court ruled that the evidence

was relevant to Hansen's intent.

R. 223.

Second, the court

determined that it would be impossible to make sense of the tape
if Hansen's statements were redacted.

R. 224. The court seemed

to be under the inexplicable perception that if those disputed
portions of the tape were redacted, other relevant evidence would
also be lost.

R. 224-25. Third, the court noted that defense

counsel had not provided an already redacted tape.

R. 224.

Because of its inherent inflammatory potential, evidence
of prior crimes is presumed to be inadmissible.

State v.

Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997).

Prior to

admitting prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must find
that:
(1) there is a necessity for the prior crime
evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its
special probativeness and the necessity for it
outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Id. at 21.

Evidence of Hansen's statements was not necessary to

the State's case and was not relevant to his intent.
27

Any

marginal probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed
by its prejudicial effect.
A. The Other Crime Evidence Was Not Necessary To
The State7s Case As Required By Rule 404(b).
Doporto made it clear that 4 04(b) evidence must be
necessary.

JEd. at 22.

requirement.

Necessity is an independent, threshold

Even if the evidence is probative, even if its

probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, the State must
show that its admission is essential to establishing its case.
This independent requirement prevents the State from gratuitously
capitalizing on the highly prejudicial impact of 404(b) evidence.
The State must justify its use of 404(b) evidence by establishing
that the evidence is indispensable, unavoidable, or that its
admission is compelled by the circumstances of the case.
The entire transaction of the sale of cocaine between
Walker and the agents was captured on video tape.

The State

presented evidence that Hansen drove Walker to the office, and
knowing that Walker was selling the agents cocaine loaned Walker
his car to purchase the drugs, and had some knowledge of Walker's
criminal activities.

Though Hansen's intent was a central issue,

this was not a case built on circumstantial evidence where the
State had no means available to establish intent without
resorting to 404(b) evidence.

Though subject to differing

interpretations, the evidence was straightforward.

The fact that

the State's evidence could be interpreted in different ways does
not make its use of 404(b) evidence necessary.

Nearly every

criminal trial involves factual scenarios that can be explained
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in opposing ways.

If the mere fact that a given set of

circumstances is subject to different interpretations were
sufficient to establish necessity, then

Doporto would have

little meaning.
It is entirely unclear why the trial court thought that
redacting these brief conversations would render the entire tape
meaningless.

All of the aforementioned, admissible evidence

would have been presented to the jury in a clear, understandable
form.

The sequence of events would not have been disrupted.

Nor

is it clear, why, given the technological ease with which even a
few seconds of tape can be redacted, the court thought that other
admissible evidence would be lost.

Lastly, the court was given a

very specific list of the type of evidence the defense was
seeking to redact.

R. 28-30.

The trial court simply did not

need a redacted version of the tape to review in order to
determine whether the narrow class of evidence at issue was
admissible.
B. Evidence Of Hansen's Discussions About His
Ability To Procure Other Drugs Was Not Highly
Probative Of His Intent To Commit The Charged
Offense.
The Doporto court clearly reestablished the once narrow
scope of admissible evidence under Rule 4 04(b).
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).

See, e.g.. State

Doporto held that

404(b) evidence must be "highly probative of a material issue."
3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 (emphasis in the original).

"It must be

strongly probative of a material issue, a probativeness that
cannot serve as a ruse for showing that the defendant's
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propensity is such that he is likely to have committed the kind
of crime charged."

Id. at 22.

For example, in Featherson, the

State introduced evidence that the day the charged crime
occurred, the defendant made nonconsensual sexual advances to two
other women as proof of the defendant's intent to commit
aggravated sexual assault.

Id. at 427.

The court held that the

defendant's conduct earlier that day was not relevant or
probative of his state of mind.

Id.

This case is similar to State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

In DeAlo, the defendant was charged with

possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute.

The State introduced evidence that the defendant was

under investigation for drug trafficking in another state, and
admitted a "dope ledger" in the defendant's handwriting recording
drug sales made in California under Rule 404(b) to show intent.
Id. at 198-99.

The court held that uncharged allegations of drug

trafficking which were unrelated to the charged crime had
"marginal" probative value on the issue of intent.

.Id. at 199.

Evidence of Hansen's statements that he had the ability
to procure other drugs was not highly probative of his intent to
arrange the cocaine deal between Walker and the agents.

Hansen's

claim that he could obtain LSD and other drugs was not connected
to Walker's sale of cocaine to the undercover agents.

The

statements were made when Walker was gone and did not involve
Walker.

Hansen's main concern seemed to be finding employment.

Then Rasmussen told Hansen to stay while Walker was gone.
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Hansen

did not mention obtaining drugs until Rasmussen asked him.
VT. 10:39.

It is questionable that Hansen had the ability or the

intent to actually follow through with his claims.

The evidence

supports the notion that Hansen's statements were merely empty
talk.

In fact, Hansen never followed through.

R. 519, 566.

When Garcia called, Hansen retracted his claim that he could get
LSD and hung up.

R. 562-63.

C. Hansen's Statements Should Have Been Excluded
Under Rule 4 03 Because The Probative Value Was
Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect.
Even if Hansen's statements were admissible under Rule
404(b) they should have been excluded under Rule 4 03 because the
minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial impact of the evidence.

"Prior crime evidence has

inherent and unavoidable inflammatory potential."
Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.

Doporto, 308

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the

high risk of unfair prejudice when evidence of uncharged drug
offenses is admitted in a drug distribution case.

In State v.

Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 110-11 (Utah 1988), the defendant argued that
evidence of uncharged incidents of drug trafficking should not
have been admitted in his trial for racketeering by means of
narcotics distribution.

After reversing on other grounds, the

court noted, "We agree with Bell that this evidence has a high
potential for prejudice.

It is distinctly possible that this

evidence influenced the jury to convict Bell without regard to
the strength of the evidence on the crimes actually charged."
Id. at 111.
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In DeAlo, the court held that evidence of uncharged drug
trafficking was inadmissible under Rule 403.

JEd. at 198-200.

Echoing the holding in Bell, the court reversed the conviction
because of the high "probability of unfair prejudice and
confusion of the issues."

Id.

Like DeAlo, this case involves

evidence of drug activity that is unrelated to the crime charged.
Like DeAlo, the evidence of the uncharged activity is not strong.
In fact, the evidence of DeAlo's prior drug activity was stronger
than Hansen's passing remarks to the undercover agents.

And like

DeAlo and Bell, there was a high risk that the jury convicted
Hansen not on the evidence, but on the belief that he was guilty
because he is a person likely to engage in drug sales, and on an
impulse to punish him for the uncharged conduct.

Hansen's

statements should not have been admitted under Rule 403.
D. The Admission Of Hansen's Remarks To The
Agents About His Ability To Procure Drugs Was
Preiudicial Error.
Hansen was prejudiced by the admission of his remarks to
agents about his ability to procure drugs. It is important to
note that the mere fact that the jury could have concluded that
Hansen was guilty without the improper evidence does not render
the error harmless.

The central question is whether it can be

stated with assurance that the jury was not influenced by the
erroneous admission of the evidence.
at 24.

Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep.

In Doporto, the court recognized that the jury could have

concluded the victim was telling the truth without hearing the
prior crime evidence.

But because the court could not conclude
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that the jury was uninfluenced by the improper evidence when they
assessed the defendant's and the victim's credibility, the error
was not harmless.

Id.

The jury in this case had to determine whether Hansen
arranged the sale of cocaine between Walker and the agents.

It

is highly likely that the jury was influenced by evidence of
Hansen's statements.

Upon hearing Hansen's claims that he knew

where to buy drugs, the jury could easily have concluded that he
was the type of person who distributed drugs, and by virtue of
his propensity for this type of behavior, arranged the deal
between Walker and the agents.

For this reason, the error was

not harmless and reversal is required.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Ted Charles Hansen respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence, or,
in the alternative, reverse his conviction and remand this case
for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

/6

day of March, 1997.

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Section 1.

[Citizenship - Due process of Law - Equal protection]

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
ARTICLE I, SEC. 7., UTAH CONSTITUTION
[DUE PROCESS OF LAW.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
§ 58-37-8. PROHIBITED ACTS—PENALTIES
(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for
any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
§ 76-2-202. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECT COMMISSION OF
OFFENSE OR FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT;
EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally.
Evidence of a person 1 s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,

except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) Character of Victim.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness.
Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

